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UNDERVALUING THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER: HOW SOCIETAL AND 
JUDICIAL INTERESTS THREATEN THE FAIRNESS OF MULTILINGUAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
John Dingfelder Stone* 
 
Abstract: By its very nature, the right to a fair trial involves a balancing of competing 
interests. This paper examines how such a balancing process has undermined one particular 
fair trial right: the right to an interpreter under international law. In order to do so, the paper 
sets out the current contours of the right, highlighting and analysing the numerous trade offs 
that have been made in its development. The resulting analysis concludes that courts often 
prioritize judicial efficiency and economic frugality at the expense of the right to an 
interpreter with little or no understanding of the impact these decisions have on the 
effectiveness of the right. The end result is a balance that neuters the practical application of 
the right and undermines the fairness of criminal proceedings involving defendants who do 
not speak the language of the court. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By its very nature, the right to a fair trial involves a balancing of competing interests. This is 
evidenced by the name of the right itself; individuals are not entitled to a ‘perfect’ trial, only a 
‘fair’ one. Any quest for perfection must be balanced against the price that must be paid to 
attain it. Society does not extend an open line of credit to the criminal justice system, nor do 
judges have unlimited patience and tolerance. Societal and judicial desires to reduce costs, 
minimize disruptions and increase efficiency have combined to limit various aspects of the 
right to a fair trial. This trend can be most easily seen, and is perhaps most troubling, with 
respect to a fair trial right that is largely overlooked by the legal literature: the right to an 
interpreter. 
 In order to understand how the balancing of competing interests negatively affects the 
right to an interpreter under international law, this article begins with a brief explanation of 
court interpretation and its practical implications for criminal proceedings. It must be noted 
that this discussion only scratches the surface as to the negative impacts that court interpreters 
have on the fairness of a proceeding.1 The focus here is on those features of interpreting that 
deter the appointment and usage of qualified interpreters, as it is these impacts that influence 
the balancing of interests so detrimental to the development of the right. Nor does space 
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1 For a comprehensive analysis of this subject, see John Dingfelder Stone, Court Interpreters and Fair Trials 
(Palgrave Macmillan – London 2018) (forthcoming). 
Undervaluing the Right to an Interpreter: How Societal and Judicial Interests Threaten the 
Fairness of Multilingual Criminal Proceedings 
41 
allow for an exhaustive review of the right to an interpreter. Rather, the article only addresses 
the specific aspects of the right that best highlight this balancing mechanism and its negative 
implications for the right. Incorporated into this discussion is an analysis of how the 
undervaluation of the right to an interpreter vis-à-vis societal and judicial interests has 
significantly weakened the protections granted by it. 
 Two final remarks must be made as to the terminology employed in this article. First, 
although translation and interpretation are often used interchangeably in modern society, they 
are not actually synonymous. Both refer to the transfer of meaning from one language to 
another, however translation deals exclusively with written documents while interpretation 
only involves oral content.2 Having said that, for the purposes of readability, the terms are 
treated as fungible throughout. It must be emphasized, though, that this article only concerns 
itself with the ‘interpretation’ of oral content.3 A second linguistic choice that has been made 
relates to gender. Throughout the article, an assumption is made that the accused is male, 
while the court interpreter is female. This usage is not meant as a slight to either sex, rather it 
simply mirrors the common reality of criminal proceedings while improving readability. 
 
B. COURT INTERPRETATION AND ITS IMPACT 
1. The nature of interpreting 
Court interpretation is not a recent phenomenon; judges have employed interpreters to break 
through linguistic barriers in the courtroom for centuries on an as-needed basis.4 Their 
insertion into the legal process makes logical sense, as they allow the intricate and well-
honed practices that make up criminal proceedings to accommodate an individual who would 
otherwise fail to linguistically understand those proceedings.5 In short, court interpreters 
allow the other courtroom participants to continue doing what they traditionally do in a 
monolingual court environment. They are, as Morris states, viewed merely as a ‘reluctantly 
                                                
2 Ruth Morris, ‘The Moral Dilemmas of Court Interpreting’ (1995) 1(1) The Translator 25. See also Roseann 
González, Victoria F Vásquez and Holly Mikkelson, Fundamentals of Court Interpretation: Theory, Policy, and 
Practice (Carolina Academic Press 1991) 295. 
3 For an explanation as to the right to translation under international law, see John Dingfelder Stone, ‘Assessing 
the Existence of the Right to Translation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2012) 
16 Max Planck Yrbk UN L 159. 
4 González (n 2) 5 (citing cases in the United States as early as 1808); Holly Mikkelson, ‘Court Interpreting at a 
Crossroads’ (Annual Conference of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators 1999) 
<http://works.bepress.com/holly_mikkelson/10/> accessed 10 March 2017, 1 (citing cases as early as 1682). 
5 Lynn Davis and William Hewitt, ‘Lessons in Administering Justice: What Judges Need to Know about the 
Requirements, Role, and Professional Responsibilities of the Court Interpreter’ (1994) 1 Harv Latino L Rev 121, 
144-45. 
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accepted practical necessity’.6 However, the inclusion of a court interpreter into the otherwise 
well-regulated ecosystem of a criminal proceeding inevitably alters elements of that 
proceeding. Court interpreters are not a benign addition. They may create the illusion of 
normality, but it is only an illusion. The appointment of a court interpreter carries with it 
certain unavoidable costs.  
 Although judges and lawyers often consider court interpreters akin to machines, 
automatically converting one language into another, the reality is far more complex.7 
Interpretation is not like mathematics; a perfect, ‘right’ answer rarely exists. 8  Rather, 
interpreters are continuously confronted with an assortment of options for each word they 
must ‘transform’ and every option carries with it a perceptible difference in connotation or 
tone than the original word.9 Choosing to translate a word as ‘smash’ as opposed to ‘hit’ 
influences the audience’s perception of the event.10 Even something as small as saying ‘the 
dog’ as opposed to ‘a dog’ creates a meaningful impact.11 Far from being machines, court 
interpreters must exercise professional judgment in every detail of their interpretation, and 
their eventual choices unavoidably affect the proceedings. 
2. Hidden substantive errors 
As with virtually every profession, increased experience and training lead to better job 
performance. With respect to court interpreters, this expertise allows them to make the ‘best’ 
decisions given their available options, producing a more accurate interpretation.12 Yet, errors 
are an inherent and inevitable side effect of the interpreting process itself.13 This is due 
primarily to the immense complexity of interpretation,14 which requires interpreters to work 
                                                
6 Ruth Morris, ‘The Gum Syndrome: Predicaments in Court Interpreting’ (1999) 6(1) Forensic Linguistics 6, 9.  
7 Morris, ‘Moral Dilemmas’ (n 2) 27; Bente Jacobsen, ‘Pragmatics in Court Interpreting: Additions’ in Louise 
Brunette et al (eds), The Critical Link 3: Interpreters in the Community (John Benjamins 2003) 223-238, 224; 
Sandra Hale, The Discourse of Court Interpreting: Discourse Practices of the Law, the Witness and the 
Interpreter (John Benjamins 2004) 12. 
8 Michele LaVigne and Vernon McCay, ‘An Interpreter Isn’t Enough: Deafness, Language, and Due Process’ 
(2003) Wis L Rev 843, 868. 
9 Daniel Gile, Basic Concepts and Models for Interpreter and Translator Training (Rev edn, John Benjamins 
2009) 52. See also González (n 2) 239; and Morris, ‘Moral Dilemmas’ (n 2) 30-31. 
10 Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in the Judicial Process (University of 
Chicago Press 1990) 25 (noting that studies have shown that individuals who were asked to estimate the speed 
two cars were travelling when they ‘smashed into each other’ produced a ‘significantly higher’ estimate than 
those who were asked how fast the cars were going when they ‘hit each other’). 
11 Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (2nd edn, Harvard University Press 1996) 95 (noting that study 
subjects who were shown a video that did not depict a dog but subsequently asked whether they saw ‘the’ dog – 
as opposed to ‘a’ dog – were more likely to claim to have seen a dog that did not actually exist). 
12 Morris, ‘Moral Dilemmas’ (n 2) 42. 
13 Angela McCaffrey, ‘Don’t Get Lost in Translation: Teaching Law Students to Work with Language 
Interpreters’ (2000) 6 Clin L Rev 347, 393. See also Dingfelder Stone, ‘Court Interpreters and Fair Trials’ (n 1) 
(referring to various interpreter errors that can and do occur in trials). 
14 Elena De Jongh, ‘Linguistic Presence v. Linguistic Absence’ [July/August 2008] Florida B J 20, 25. 
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at the extreme edge (‘saturation point’) of their cognitive abilities.15 According to Gile, 
interpretation engages both non-automatic cognitive operations (those that involve conscious 
effort) and automatic cognitive operations (those that do not). 16  As interpreters gain 
experience and training, they ‘automate’ certain aspects of the interpreting process, allowing 
them to focus more of their limited cognitive capacity on the remaining non-automatic 
operations, consequently improving interpretive output and reducing the likelihood of 
errors.17 This is similar to learning to ride a bicycle, which requires effort and concentration 
at first, but with time becomes second nature and allows one to simultaneously perform other 
actions. With that in mind, even the best-trained and most experienced interpreters make 
‘numerous’ errors.18 
Although such errors are unavoidable, they remain largely unnoticed by other courtroom 
participants, who generally only speak the language of the court and are thus privy to the 
interpreter’s output but not the speaker’s foreign language input. Without this frame of 
reference for comparison, courtroom participants overlook even the most egregious errors of 
interpretation because they are restricted to the end product, which appears flawless on its 
own. Furthermore, since these same courtroom participants think of interpreting as a 
mechanical process with a singular ‘right’ answer, they often fail to appreciate that such 
errors could even exist. As such, the negative impact of poor interpretation, although both 
inevitable and significant,19 on criminal proceedings generally remains hidden from view. 
Yet, even though judges are ignorant of the true cost of courtroom interpretation, they are still 
generally reluctant to appoint court interpreters.20 This has much to do with the more 
noticeable drawbacks associated with their appointment. 
3.  Subtle distortions of communication  
While courtroom participants may not be cognizant of the specific errors made in an 
interpretation, they are generally well aware that the employment of a court interpreter 
significantly changes the precision of communication in the courtroom. Telford Taylor, 
reflecting on his time as a Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, likened working through an 
                                                
15 Gile, Basic Concepts (n 9) 159, 182. 
16 ibid, 159. 
17 González (n 2) 333. 
18 Daniel Gile, ‘Conference Interpreting as a Cognitive Management Problem’ in Franz Pöchhacker and Miriam 
Shlesinger (eds), The Interpreting Studies Reader (Routledge 2002) 162-177, 163. 
19 Dingfelder Stone, ‘Court Interpreters and Fair Trials’ (n 1) 252-281. 
20 Williamson Chang and Manuel Araujo, ‘Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-
Speaking Defendant’ (1975) 63 Cal L Rev 801, 802 (with respect to the US); Kathy Laster and Veronica Taylor, 
Interpreters and the Legal System (The Federation Press 1994) 96-97 (with respect to Australia). 
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interpreter to ‘conversation through a double mattress’.21 Lawyers and judges in particular 
feel the impact of working with court interpreters, as they frequently use language as a tool to 
achieve a specific goal,22 and many believe interpreters are ‘too blunt an instrument to 
accurately convey their exact intent across language barriers.’23 There is an ‘inherent loss of 
meaning’ whenever a word or phrase is translated from one language into another, whether it 
takes on other connotations in the output language, loses those it originally possessed in the 
source, or perhaps both simultaneously. 24  Likewise, ambiguous language, which is 
purposefully employed by lawyers in the courtroom, 25  tends to lose its ambiguity in 
translation, as the interpreter must choose one of its associated meanings. For example, 
consider the different possible meanings of the question ‘Did you have anything to drink in 
the car?’ These more subtle shifts in meaning, when combined with the outright errors that 
remain hidden from view, produce an understandable but distorted communication. 
 Interpretation also unsettles courtroom communication through its complexity. Since 
interpreters struggle at the edge of their limited cognitive capacity, they often 
(understandably) prioritize accuracy of content over fluidity of speaking style.26 However, 
interpreters also have a competing economic incentive to generate a comprehensible end 
product, since lawyers and judges regularly assess their competence based on the 
intelligibility of their interpretation.27 This may lead interpreters to remove information they 
did not understand,28 clarify concepts that were unclear or ambiguous,29 or clean up inelegant 
or poorly formulated speech.30 Each of these practices, though ultimately useful in producing 
                                                
21 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Doubleday 1992) 101. 
22 Hale, Discourse of Court Interpreting (n 7) 13. See also Yvonne Fowler, ‘The Courtroom Interpreter: Paragon 
and Intruder?’ in Silvana Carr, Roda Roberts, Aideen Dufour and Dini Steyn (eds), The Critical Link: 
Interpreters in the Community (John Benjamins 1995) 191-200, 194 (‘Lawyers design their questions in order to 
achieve a number of clearly identifiable ends. Accusations, challenges, justifications, denials, and rebuttals may 
all be packaged as questions and answers.’) 
23 Brandon Tuck, ‘Comment: Preserving Facts, Form, and Function When a Deaf Witness with Minimal 
Language Skills Testifies in Court’ (2010) 158 U Pa L Rev 905, 906. 
24 Frans Viljoen, ‘Look Who’s Talking, in the Courtroom, Too!’ (1992) 109 SALJ 64, 69. 
25 Elena De Jongh, An Introduction to Court Interpreting: Theory & Practice (University Press of America 
1992) 116. 
26 See, for example, the coping strategies of transcoding (wherein the interpreter translates a word for which she 
cannot remember the exact analog) and form-based interpreting (wherein the interpreter interprets word-for-
word what was said, without concern for whether the end result is comprehendible) that interpreters are taught, 
which prioritize preservation of content over style considerations. See Gile, Basic Concepts (n 9) 208-09. 
27 Sandra Hale, ‘Challenges of Court Interpreting: Intricacies, Responsibilities and Ramifications’ (2007) 32 Alt 
L J 198, 200. 
28 Gile, Basic Concepts (n 9) 210. 
29 González (n 2) 479-480. 
30 ibid, 27; Morris, ‘Moral Dilemmas’ (n 2) 38; Alejandra Hayes and Sandra Hale, ‘Appeals on Incompetent 
Interpreting’ (2010) 20(2) JJA 119, 121. 
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the coherent interpretation that both judges and lawyers expect,31 distort the precision of the 
end communication in ways that can be felt, even if not patently obvious. 
4. The issue of time 
The involvement of court interpreters also negatively impacts the efficiency of the courtroom 
in a variety of ways. At the outset, simply finding a suitable interpreter can delay 
proceedings, particularly with respect to rare languages where qualified interpreters can be 
difficult to find.32 Such delays not only undermine the court’s efficiency and scheduling 
(which is often a pet peeve of judges) but can also adversely affect the reliability and 
discoverability of evidence in the case.33 Indeed, when faced with the prospect of such a 
delay, it is not unheard of for judges to appoint an unqualified or inappropriate court 
interpreter,34 or even forge ahead without one.35 Similar delays can also affect the work of 
investigators in the pre-trial phase.36 
 The act of interpreting itself likewise adds to the overall length of a trial. Most 
witnesses in domestic trials who do not speak the language of the court will be interpreted 
consecutively.37 This means that the interpreter waits for the original speaker to finish before 
interpreting their speech. 38  As every speech segment is repeated twice, consecutive 
interpretation virtually doubles the amount of time necessary to question a witness.39 Even 
simultaneous interpretation of the proceedings to a foreign language accused is not without 
its necessary delays; although the practice is often ignored at the domestic level, interpreters 
require breaks every 30-45 minutes in order to avoid an increase in errors from mental 
fatigue.40 
                                                
31 González (n 2) 156; Beth Gottesman Lindie, ‘Inadequate Interpreting Services in Courts and the Rules of 
Admissibility of Testimony on Extrajudicial Interpretations’ (1993) 48 U Miami L Rev 399, 413; Hale, 
‘Challenges’ (n 27) 200. 
32 Glen Craney, ‘Language v. the Law’ (1989-90) 16 Barrister 20, 22; Holly Mikkelson, ‘The Court Interpreter 
as Guarantor of Defendant Rights’ (First European Congress on Court Interpreting and Legal Translation – Graz 
1998) <http://works.bepress.com/holly_mikkelson/8/> accessed 10 March 2017, 6. 
33 Stephanos Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Analysis of the Application of the Convention and a Comparison with Other Instruments 
(Nijhoff 1993) 77. 
34 Baytar v Turkey App no 45440/04 (ECtHR Second Section, 14 October 2014) §19 (where the domestic court 
appointed a member of the accused’s family as interpreter in order to continue with the proceedings). 
35 Cuscani v UK App no 32771/96 (2002) 36 EHRR 2, §17-18 (where the court went ahead with a sentencing 
hearing despite the unexpected absence of the accused’s court interpreter). 
36 Catherine Namakula, Language and the Right to Fair Hearing in International Criminal Trials (Springer 
2014) 13 (with respect to the ICTR, though the concern would be equally applicable to domestic authorities as 
well). 
37 González (n 2) 163; Davis and Hewitt (n 5) 130-31. The opposite is true of international criminal tribunals, 
where simultaneous interpretation of witnesses is the norm. See Namakula (n 36) 107. 
38 González (n 2) 379. 
39 Davis and Hewitt (n 5) 130; Namakula (n 36) 8. 
40 Marianne Mason, Courtroom Interpreting (University Press of America 2008) 9 (noting that studies show the 
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5. A necessary loss of control 
In addition to lengthening criminal proceedings, court interpreters also upset the usual power 
dynamics of the courtroom. Patricia Wald, a former Judge at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, admitted that she knew of ‘no judge…who does not 
acknowledge that he or she is totally at the mercy of the translator in the courtroom.’41 The 
interpreter often has an unassailable chokehold on communications between the foreign 
language participant and the court. However, their control over the proceedings extends far 
beyond mere language issues; certain aspects of court interpretation require interpreters to 
exercise authority that normally belongs with the judge. 
 For example, where a speaker is too long-winded or does not speak clearly or loudly 
enough, the interpreter will interrupt the proceedings in order to alleviate the problem.42 The 
same is true where two people talk at once, or someone speaks too quickly or too slowly.43 
Interpreters may also stop the proceedings to ask a speaker to clarify or repeat a statement.44 
In such circumstances the interpreter will also interrupt the judge,45 an act about which the 
other courtroom participants would not even dare dream. Such interruptions make both 
lawyers and judges uncomfortable, as they represent an alteration to the traditional 
formalities and power structures of the courtroom. They can even lead to overt irritation 
between the interpreter and other participants.46 Their impact however is not limited to 
questions of comfort and dominance. Studies have shown that interpreter interruptions 
undermine the credibility of an interrupted lawyer in the eyes of the fact finder,47 while 
conversely increasing the credibility of witnesses who are interrupted.48 In relation to 
interpreter performance, the act of interrupting a speaker has also been proven to increase an 
                                                                                                                                                  
error rate for interpreters increases considerably after 30 minutes of continuous interpreting). See also Charles 
Grabau and Llewellyn Gibbons, ‘Protecting the Rights of Linguistic Minorities: Challenges to Court 
Interpretation’ (1996) 30 New Eng L Rev 227, 296. 
41 Patricia Wald, ‘Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy’ (2006) 27 Cardozo L Rev 1559, 
1571. 
42 Mason (n 40) 41; Berk-Seligson (n 10) 191. 
43 Debra Hovland, ‘Errors in Interpretation: Why Plain Error is Not Plain’ (1992-93) 11 Law & Ineq J 473, 476; 
Davis and Hewitt (n 5) 134. 
44 González (n 2) 395; Berk-Seligson (n 10) 66, 89. 
45 Roxana Cardenas, ‘“You Don’t Have to Hear, Just Interpret!”: How Ethnocentrism in the California Courts 
Impedes Equal Access to the Courts for Spanish Speakers’ (Fall 2001) Court Rev 24. 
46 Morris, ‘Moral Dilemmas’ (n 2) 40. See also Cardenas (n 45) 24 (recounting how one interpreter who asked 
the judge to speak more loudly was told ‘[y]ou don’t have to hear, just interpret!’) 
47 Berk-Seligson (n 10) 187-88. 
48 ibid, 190-93. 
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interpreter’s error rate. 49  Thus, changes in courtroom dynamics brought about by the 
appointment of an interpreter present both noticeable and hidden costs. 
6. The overall situation 
As can be seen from the above discussion, even leaving aside the more insidious (and largely 
unnoticed) interpreter errors that are beyond the remit of this paper, the utilization of a court 
interpreter negatively impacts courtroom participants in a variety of noticeable ways. Taken 
on their own, these adverse effects can simply be seen as part of the standard operating costs 
of an unusual criminal proceeding. However, in an effort to avoid or minimize these costs, 
judges have interpreted and implemented the right to an interpreter in ways that ultimately 
undermine the protection that it is meant to provide. To better understand this development, it 
is necessary to expand upon certain specific aspects of the right to an interpreter.  
 
C. THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. Source and purpose of the right 
The right to an interpreter finds its origins in article 14(3)(f) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that every individual facing a criminal 
charge is entitled to ‘the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court.’ 50  The broad acceptance of article 14 ICCPR as customary 
international law signifies its position in this regard as the benchmark for the right to an 
interpreter.51 Since article 6(3)(e) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) contains identical language,52 interpretations by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) offer highly persuasive authority as to the 
meaning of article 14(3)(f) ICCPR as well. Unfortunately, in this context, no other judicial 
mechanism or treaty body provides further meaningful assistance in the development of the 
right to an interpreter. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights does not contain 
an explicit right to an interpreter,53 and while the Inter-American system clearly provides 
such a right, case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the subject is virtually 
                                                
49 Mason (n 40) 46-47. 
50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
51 See Patrick Robinson, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference to the Work of 
the ICTY’ (2009) 3 Berk J Intl L Publicist 1, 6-7. See also Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law (OUP 2006) 60; and Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘Nationalizing International Criminal Law’ 
(2005) 41 Stanford J Intl L 1, 22. 
52 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed 4 November 1950, 
entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
53 See African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986) 1520 UNTS 217, art 7. 
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non-existent.54 Some case law exists in the international criminal tribunals, however these 
decisions are specific to the procedures and interpreter practices guaranteed in these courts, 
and are not sufficiently analogous to national proceedings to be of much use in this analysis. 
As such, this article focuses primarily on the provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR, since, 
taken together, much of the modern right to an interpreter arises from the interpretation of 
these two instruments.  
Nevertheless, there is more to the right to an interpreter than explicitly granted by 
these instruments, since they only ensure the presence of an interpreter where the defendant 
himself lacks competence in the language of the court. Various other situations can arise that 
require the employment use of a court interpreter as a matter of right in order to ensure the 
overall fairness of the proceedings. For example, where a language-competent defendant 
wishes to present evidence from a foreign language witness as a part of his defence, his right 
to call and examine witnesses under article 14(3)(e) ICCPR and article 6(3)(d) ECHR 
naturally entitles him to use of a court interpreter on behalf of the witness even where his 
explicit ‘right to an interpreter’ would not. As such, an additional, secondary right to an 
interpreter arguably exists above the ‘minimum guarantees’ set out in article 14(3)(f) ICCPR 
and article 6(3)(e) ECHR.55 When interpreting the right to an interpreter under international 
law then, one must look beyond the narrow confines of the text and consider the requirements 
of a fair trial overall. 
The right to an interpreter is not a standalone right, but rather is meant as part of a 
larger package of guarantees designed to ensure the overall fairness of criminal proceedings. 
Within this larger framework, the right to an interpreter serves several purposes, and must be 
interpreted with these in mind. One such purpose, as stated by the UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) in its General Comment No. 13, is to remove any obstacles to the general 
right of defence that might arise from language difficulties. 56  This right of defence 
encompasses other fair trial rights, among them an accused’s right to be present at, and 
participate in, criminal proceedings against him.57 In this context, Trechsel argues that the 
right is part of the accused’s ‘right to be heard’, which in his opinion signifies a right not just 
                                                
54 See American Convention on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
1144 UNTS 123, art 8(2)(a). 
55 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and 
Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law (Article 14) (13 April 1984) UN Doc A/39/40 at 
143, §5 (stating that the ‘requirements of paragraph 3 are minimum guarantees, the observance of which is not 
always sufficient to ensure the fairness of a hearing’). 
56 ibid, §13. 
57 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, Engel 2005) 337-
38. 
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to participate, but also to be ‘understood’.58 For its part, the ECtHR has grounded the right to 
an interpreter in the concept of equality, stating that the right was ‘specifically designed to 
attenuate’ the ‘disadvantages that an accused who does not understand or speak the language 
used in court suffers as compared with an accused who is familiar with that language’.59   
The right to an interpreter fulfils several different functions within the overall fair trial 
scheme. Acknowledging its different roles, and the specific fair trial rights it is meant to 
support, is important to understanding the legal boundaries of the right, since the right itself 
has evolved in an attempt to satisfy these roles. In this context, identifying what the right is 
meant to accomplish is key to appreciating how courts routinely overvalue their own interests 
vis-à-vis the fulfilment of the right, since they mistakenly believe the right has been 
adequately protected simply because one isolated purpose has been satisfied. 
2. The appointment of a court interpreter 
a)  Aspects of the right 
The first major aspect of the right to an interpreter that must be addressed is the appointment 
of the interpreter herself. For the purposes of this article, the discussion will focus only on the 
explicit textual guarantee of the right, which grants an accused individual an interpreter 
where he meets two basic requirements. First, he must be facing a criminal charge. Although 
slightly different in wording, both article 14(3) ICCPR (‘any criminal charge against him’) 
and article 6(3) ECHR (‘charged with a criminal offence’) make a criminal ‘charge’ the 
trigger mechanism for the attachment of an individual’s fair trial rights. In this context, a 
‘charge’ must be autonomously defined, meaning that the existence of a charge is 
independently determined and is not reliant on any ‘formal classification under national 
law.’60 As such, once the State has charged the accused with a criminal offence (or its actions 
‘substantially affect the situation of the person concerned’),61 a language-deficient individual 
is entitled to an interpreter. For its part, the ECtHR has also extended the right to an 
interpreter to the investigation stage.62 
                                                
58 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2005) 328. 
59 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç v Germany (1978) Series A no 29, §42. 
60 Nowak (n 57) 318. See also Pieter van Dijk, ‘Access to Court’ in Ronald St John MacDonald, Franz Matscher 
and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Nijhoff 2003) 345-379, 
361. 
61 Nowak (n 57) 319. 
62 Saman v Turkey, App no 35292/05 (ECtHR Second Section, 5 April 2011) §30 (‘Finally, the Court has ruled 
that the assistance of an interpreter should be provided during the investigation stage unless it can be 
demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of the case that there are compelling reasons to restrict 
this right’). See also Diallo v Sweden, App no 13205/07 (ECtHR Third Section, 5 January 2010) §24-25. 
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 Second, and of more relevance to this paper, the accused must not be able to 
‘understand or speak the language used in court’.63 In this regard, both article 14(3)(f) ICCPR 
and article 6(3)(e) ECHR create a threshold of language incompetence whereby the right to 
an interpreter is activated. The dilemmas here are: (i) establishing that threshold; and (ii) 
determining who is qualified to assess the accused’s language ability with respect to that 
threshold. Unfortunately, the ECtHR and HRC fail to provide any easy answers. 
 In Guesdon v. France, an admittedly French-speaking accused asserted his right to an 
interpreter in French courts because he and his witnesses preferred to express themselves in 
their native Breton language.64 The HRC held that the accused was not entitled to an 
interpreter, since he and his witnesses were ‘sufficiently proficient in the court’s language’ so 
as to avoid any ‘difficulties in understanding, or expressing themselves in the court’.65 As 
such, the right to an interpreter is only triggered where an interpreter is necessary for 
communication and understanding, not simply where the accused could more easily 
communicate through an interpreter. While this decision accords with the explicit language of 
the right, it fails to provide any guidance on the level of proficiency that would be 
‘sufficient’. The ECtHR has, to a limited extent, helped in this regard by providing some 
basic guidelines. In Hermi v. Italy, the ECtHR noted that a determination as to the necessity 
of appointing an interpreter must consider ‘the nature of the offence with which the defendant 
is charged and any communications addressed to him by the domestic authorities, in order to 
assess whether they are sufficiently complex to require a detailed knowledge of the language 
used in court.’66 Thus, the threshold of language ‘sufficiency’ arguably changes based on the 
level of the language used in court itself.  
b) Analysis 
This is a somewhat troubling standard, as it requires the court (or investigating authorities) to 
anticipate the linguistic complexity of proceedings that have yet to take full shape. 
Regardless, the underlying concern in both Guesdon and Hermi is the communication and 
understanding of the accused during court proceedings as the guiding principle in the 
appointment of a court interpreter.67 Or, put differently by Trechsel, ‘[t]he interpretation only 
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serves the communication.’68 Although this conception of the right faithfully tracks the plain 
language of both article 14(3)(f) ICCPR and article 6(3)(e) ECHR, it obviates one of the 
stated purposes of the right itself, which is to reduce any ‘disadvantages that an accused who 
does not understand or speak the language used in court suffers as compared with an accused 
who is familiar with that language.’69 Surely, one of these disadvantages would be the 
inability to express oneself to the full extent of one’s inherent capabilities. In other words, 
while a native or fluent speaker of the court’s language may understand and communicate as 
fully as their intelligence will allow, this is not a luxury granted to an accused who is only 
‘sufficiently proficient’ in the court’s language. To settle for ‘sufficiency’ (as opposed to 
‘fluency’) is to set the bar fairly low. 
 Naturally, appointing a court interpreter every time an accused prefers to use a 
different language, or their language skills fall above ‘sufficiency’ but below ‘fluency’, 
would lead to increased financial costs, discomfort of other courtroom participants in the 
manners previously discussed, and delayed proceedings. Yet, to a large extent, these are the 
necessary costs of placing an accused on the same footing as other defendants (to say nothing 
of equality with a State representative who is surely a native or fluent speaker). For better or 
worse, the right to an interpreter as applied by both the ECtHR and the HRC seeks not to 
create such full equality, but rather only to ensure ‘sufficient’ communication and 
understanding of the process. This is a conscious decision to not only follow the strict 
language of the right, but also prioritize the efficient workings of the court over any interests 
of actual equality by not encumbering it with an ‘unnecessary’ court interpreter. 
 More problems and tradeoffs arise with respect to the application of the language 
threshold. Even where one knows that the accused must have ‘sufficient’ language 
competence, and even if one can figure out what level of language is ‘sufficient’ to achieve 
that threshold, the difficulty remains of actually assessing whether an accused has that level 
of language. Following Hermi, it must be accepted that language competence is a moving 
target, changing from case-to-case. Here, distinctions must be drawn between the complexity 
of the proceedings themselves (eg complicated tax fraud cases as opposed to simple theft 
charges), and the accused’s role within them (eg active versus passive participation in the 
proceedings). Each situation requires different linguistic abilities. However, while it may be 
commonly accepted that something more than ‘everyday language…is required’, accurately 
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and objectively assessing an accused’s linguistic competence is exceedingly difficult.70 The 
Council of Europe, for example, spent over two decades debating and formulating the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, and entire industries now exist 
to implement its six levels of language proficiency and the multitude of possible language 
assessment techniques it sets out.71 Furthermore, it is not a given that the accused will even 
cooperate in the process,72 or that he will honestly admit to any language deficiency for fear 
of appearing ‘ignorant or unintelligent’.73 Thus, the determination of language ‘sufficiency’ is 
problematic, and highly dependent on the specific context.  
Perhaps for this reason, courts mainly employ a case-by-case approach, with the 
determination left up to the individual trial judge and their discretion.74 While this solution 
has the obvious benefit of accommodating the necessity of a case-specific determination, it 
unfortunately suffers from several serious limitations. For instance, judges are trained in law, 
not in assessing an individual’s linguistic proficiency. Perhaps due to this lack of training, 
judges make a number of faulty assumptions with respect to language, such as assuming that 
residents of a country necessarily have sufficient linguistic ability75 and that individuals with 
normal conversational language skills are able to understand the sophisticated legal language 
used in criminal proceedings.76 Judges also often underestimate the ‘unique needs of the 
linguistic minority in the courtroom’,77 perhaps specifically because the courtroom (and the 
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language used therein) is an environment with which they are intimately familiar. In short, 
judges lack the necessary background and ability to effectively fulfil this role. 
 It is understandable why the right to an interpreter has developed in this manner; 
empowering the trial court judge to make this assessment is the cheapest and most efficient 
option. To require a qualified linguist to assess every foreign accused for language 
proficiency would result in both additional expenses and further delays. Naturally, an expert 
linguist would make a more accurate determination, but both the HRC and the ECtHR 
obviously believe that any gain in accuracy would be outweighed by the aforementioned 
negatives. This indicates a gross undervaluing of the right to an interpreter, making access to 
the right secondary to minor considerations of cost and efficiency. Moreover, what access 
does exist is made contingent on the discretion of an individual manifestly unqualified to 
make such an assessment alone. This is akin to allowing a judge to rule independently on the 
mental capacity of an individual because consulting a psychiatrist would be too expensive 
and take too long – a result the ECtHR would find unthinkable.78 That appellate courts, which 
have the time and opportunity to accurately assess the accused’s linguistic ability through 
expert opinions submitted by both parties after the fact, then defer to the trial court’s 
judgment on the issue, adds insult to injury.79 
3. The competence of the court interpreter and/or interpretation 
a) Aspects of the right 
The mere appointment of a court interpreter does not fulfill an accused’s right under 
international law – some minimum level of quality is implied by the entitlement to a court 
interpreter.80 As such, the question of competence applies not just to the accused’s language 
abilities, but also to the court interpreter and her eventual interpretation. Although neither the 
ECtHR nor the HRC have provided much in the way of guidance as to the quality level that 
must be attained, some useful fragments of assistance can be gleaned from the limited case 
law that exists. 
 In Kamasinski v. Austria, the ECtHR held that the defendant’s right to an interpreter 
had not been violated since it was not convinced that the final interpretation compromised the 
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fairness of the defendant’s proceedings.81 The ECtHR found this to be the case despite the 
fact that the accused had been questioned several times by authorities using, among others, an 
unregistered interpreter and a fellow prisoner of limited linguistic skill.82 Thus, from the 
perspective of the ECtHR, the identity of the interpreter (and her specific qualifications and 
training) is of minimal concern in determining the accuracy of the eventual interpretation. 
Such a practice is of little use to trial judges who are tasked with appointing court interpreters 
but, absent a working time machine, are unable to assess their eventual interpretation 
beforehand. Given this limitation, the ECtHR has recognized that national court trial judges 
only have a duty to supervise and verify the adequacy of the interpreter’s skills.83 
 There is as yet no agreed upon way for States to verify the competence of their court 
interpreters. National courts mostly focus on the actual qualifications of the interpreter, 
though this takes a variety of forms. In some States, such as the United States of America (the 
federal system)84 and Denmark,85 mandatory certification regimes have been instituted to 
ensure that only those interpreters that have been certified through an examination process 
are technically allowed to interpret in court. Other States either use a non-mandatory 
certification system (such as Australia),86 devolve the maintenance of a certification regime 
to the individual courts within the State (such as Belgium),87 leave the assessment of 
interpreter qualifications to the trial judges themselves (such as Canada),88 or have no quality 
assurance standards at all (such as Spain89 and Israel90). As such, a number of different 
systems have been implemented to verify the competence of court interpreters before their 
appointment. However, neither the HRC nor the ECtHR have expressed any preference or 
standards for States in this regard. The ECtHR has even gone so far as to say that it did not 
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consider it ‘appropriate … to lay down any detailed conditions concerning the method by 
which interpreters may be provided to assist accused persons.’91 
 Regardless of the appointment procedures employed by the State, the focus at the 
appellate level remains not on the qualifications of the interpreter but rather on her 
performance. As the ECtHR noted in Kamasinski, national courts are ultimately responsible 
for the ‘adequacy of the interpretation provided’ where they are ‘put on notice’ as to its 
possible inadequacy.92 What qualifies as ‘adequate’ in this context though is a matter of 
serious debate and remains highly unsettled. Kamasinski remains the leading ECtHR case in 
this area, wherein the Court asserted that the ‘interpretation assistance provided should be 
such as to enable the defendant to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend 
himself, notably by being able to put before the court his version of the events.’93 In 
Kamasinski however, the ECtHR held that the accused’s right to an interpreter had not been 
violated even though the accused was afforded only a summary interpretation of his trial, and 
indeed parts of his trial were not interpreted for him at all.94 
b) Analysis 
Taking Kamasinski at face value suggests that a summarized version of the proceedings is 
sufficient to fulfil an accused’s right to an interpreter. Summary interpretations hold some 
benefit for a court, such as reducing disruptions to the power dynamics of the courtroom, as it 
eliminates any need to reproduce a word-for-word account of the proceedings and reduces the 
need for the interpreter to interrupt in order to clarify specific points. Likewise, it 
marginalizes both the interpreter and the foreign language participant to the extent that the 
court no longer needs to worry about them and can proceed as normal. Since summary 
interpretation does not require the accuracy or completeness of other forms of interpreting,95 
the drain on the cognitive resources of the interpreter is less, which likely removes the 
necessity of giving the interpreter breaks for fatigue. Thus, summary interpretation allows the 
court to protect its traditional, monolingual procedures from the normal disruptions 
associated with court interpretation.  
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 The price paid, however, is quite high. Summary interpretation is not as accurate as 
either simultaneous or consecutive interpretation.96 For this reason, scholars (and some 
judges) have argued that an accused is entitled to a complete, non-summarized version of the 
proceedings in order to achieve a fair trial.97 Anything less than this would call into question 
the accused’s ability to truly understand and participate in the finer details of the 
proceedings.98 The practice at the international level, including the International Criminal 
Court and several of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, also adheres to this standard,99 as do many 
prominent national court systems.100 Similarly, interpreting associations frown upon the 
practice of summary interpretation,101 and the modern trend is away from its utilization.102 
Given the weight of opinion against summary interpretation, the ECtHR’s holding that an 
accused is not entitled to more accurate methods of interpretation is especially troubling as it 
represents a decision that the court’s interest in efficiency outweighs the necessity of an 
accurate interpretation. If the interpretation need not be accurate, then there is little point in 
having a right to an interpreter. Moreover, Kamasinski evidences a fundamental 
misunderstanding of court interpretation by the ECtHR; to hold that an interpretation may be 
simultaneously ‘competent’ and ‘summarized’ is to speak in contradictions. 
 On a positive note, there is some doubt as to the whether Kamasinski truly creates a 
legal precedent endorsing summary interpretation. It is also possible that the failure of the 
accused to file a formal objection to the interpretation, a point emphasized by the ECtHR in 
its holding and often (as will be seen shortly) considered a form of waiver on the accused’s 
part, may have negated any concerns about the deficient interpretation that was given.103 
Although the ECtHR in Kamasinski appears to endorse the ‘adequacy’ of summary 
interpretation, this issue is far from settled either logically or legally. 
 Another area in which the development of the right to an interpreter has prioritized 
efficiency and costs over the effectiveness of the right concerns the loose standards by which 
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an individual may be considered an ‘interpreter’ for the purposes of the right. As Trechsel 
notes, the ‘case-law does not indicate any limits as to who can function as an interpreter.’104 
While this summary sounds bad enough, it actually undersells the problem: ECtHR case law 
tacitly sanctions the appointment of manifestly unqualified individuals. In Kamasinski, the 
ECtHR ruled that a fellow prisoner with only ‘limited knowledge’ of the accused’s language 
was a sufficiently competent interpreter. 105  Similarly in Baytar v. Turkey, the ECtHR 
implicitly left open the possibility that a ‘member of the applicant’s family waiting in the 
corridor’ would have been a competent interpreter.106 Unfortunately, the ECtHR’s attitude in 
this regard is not unique. In many national courts, simply being bilingual is often considered 
sufficient for appointment as an interpreter.107 This approach to court interpretation leads 
courts to appoint individuals without regard to their qualifications, experience or actual skills, 
simply because they are available at the time. Stories abound of janitors,108 courthouse 
clerks, 109  local language teachers, 110  children, 111  law enforcement officers, prosecution 
witnesses, and co-defendants in the same case112 being appointed as court interpreters. There 
are even a few instances of the accused being asked to interpret for the victim he allegedly 
assaulted.113 Perhaps even more unfortunate is that the ECtHR has openly abandoned any 
requirement for interpreters to be impartial or independent.114  
 The acceptance of such individuals as ‘competent’ interpreters makes sense only if 
one believes that interpreters are indeed machines that simply perform a mechanical function. 
In this vein of thinking, every bilingual individual is competent to interpret simply because 
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they are bilingual. However this mistakes possession of a tool (bilingualism) with the 
competence to use that tool for a specific, defined purpose (to interpret).115 As has been 
discussed, interpreters must exercise their professional judgment with every choice of word 
and phrase, as very few ‘perfect’ answers exist.116 Errors are not an aberration; they are 
common, even for the most experienced and well-trained interpreters.117 Bilingual speakers 
without the benefit of training or experience can be expected to make significantly more, to 
the extent that their utilization substantially threatens the efficacy of the right to an 
interpreter.118 The acceptance and endorsement of such interpreters by courts as fulfilling an 
accused’s right to an interpreter seriously diminishes the right’s value in practice. 
 The question then becomes how to ensure that competent individuals are appointed as 
court interpreters. If judges are unqualified to assess an accused’s language proficiency, as 
argued above, they can hardly be expected to adequately evaluate a court interpreter’s 
professional skills,119 regardless of the expectations set out by the ECtHR in Baytar.120 
Indeed, judges have a particularly bad track record worldwide when it comes to appointing 
untrained and inexperienced individuals as court interpreters, and generally lack the ability to 
distinguish between good and bad interpretation.121 Even where the judge is bilingual, they 
will likely lack the training to understand the subtleties of the interpreter’s professional 
choices, not to mention that the judge can hardly be expected to simultaneously supervise 
both the legal and linguistic aspects of the proceedings.122 One practical solution to this 
problem would be certification standards: requiring interpreters to prove their competence in 
a regulated manner before their appointment. However the ECtHR has explicitly refused to 
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impose any certification or registration requirements on national courts as a part of the right 
to an interpreter,123 and the HRC has provided no guidance in this area. 
 Here again, concerns over impeded efficiency and increased costs can be seen to 
outweigh the practical protection of the right to a competent interpreter. Certification 
procedures are expensive to establish and maintain,124 to the extent that even for large nations 
like the United States it is only considered cost efficient to certify interpreters in a few select 
languages. 125  Furthermore, certification programmes limit the number of available 
interpreters, thereby driving up the cost of employing those that are actually qualified.126 The 
reduction in the pool of interpreters also makes it more difficult to find and schedule a 
qualified interpreter, adding to potential delays in the proceedings. Indeed, the problem is 
pervasive enough that many programmes also contain loopholes and exceptions that give 
judges the discretion to avoid lengthy and costly postponements.127 Whatever the faults of 
certification systems, their ability to ensure a higher level of court interpretation cannot be 
questioned. The explicit abandonment of any formal competency standards as a part of the 
right to an interpreter leaves the right highly ineffectual, and evidences once again a victory 
for judicial efficiency and decreased financial costs at the expense of effective legal 
protection. 
4. Appellate Oversight of the Right 
a) Aspects of the Right 
It is important to note that the right to an interpreter consists of (and is limited by) procedural 
elements as well. The accused may be substantively entitled to ‘adequate’ interpretation, but 
to vindicate this right at the appellate level he must first clear certain procedural hurdles. One 
obvious example arises from the language in Kamasinski, which only holds States 
responsible for an inadequate interpretation where they were previously ‘put on notice’ as to 
the inadequacy of the interpretation at trial.128 In other words, the accused must formally 
object (or at least complain) about the interpretation during the proceedings and allow the 
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trial court to fix the problem, otherwise he will have waived his right.129 The HRC has ruled 
similarly. In Griffin v. Spain, the HRC refused to entertain the accused’s legitimate 
complaints of an inadequate interpretation since he failed to complain to the trial court during 
the proceedings.130 Therefore, even where the substantive obligations of the right to an 
interpreter have not been fulfilled, the accused may not be entitled to relief due to procedural 
requirements. 
 Nor is the necessity of a contemporaneous complaint the only procedural limitation on 
the right, as the accused must also show that the inadequate interpretation actually led to his 
conviction. In Panasenko v. Portugal, the ECtHR was provided a recording of the trial 
showing the inadequate interpretation, and even after admitting that problems with the 
interpretation existed, ruled that the accused had failed to show how the faulty interpretation 
had affected the fairness of the proceedings.131 The opposite result occurred in Baytar, where 
the ECtHR found a violation ‘[e]ven though the conviction was based on a number of 
factors’, since ‘it is nevertheless established that the statements obtained … without the 
assistance of an interpreter were also relied upon when the applicant was found guilty.’132 
The conclusion to be reached from these cases is that an inadequate (or non-existent) 
interpretation on its own is not a violation. Rather, it is only where that interpretation 
contributes to the conviction of the defendant that the right to an interpreter has been violated. 
In essence, the ECtHR has created a harm standard, whereby the accused must shoulder the 
burden of proving that the substantive infringement of his right to an adequate interpretation 
has in some way undermined the fairness of the proceedings.  
b) Analysis 
On some level it makes perfect sense that the accused, who is in the best position to know 
whether or not he understands the proceedings, bears the burden of notifying the court of this 
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deficiency as it occurs.133 It allows the court to immediately repair the deficiency and 
prevents the accused (or his counsel) from purposefully letting an appellate issue ripen. 
However such a policy leaves the obligation of assertion and protection of the right to an 
individual who, by definition, does not actually understand what is going on in the 
courtroom.134 Moreover, if he does not comprehend the proceedings or does not speak the 
language of the court, and likely has little knowledge of court procedures, it is highly 
doubtful that the accused will be aware that such an assertion is necessary or even possible. 
Nor can it be assumed that the accused will know that the interpretation is inadequate, since 
interpreter error is not always obvious to parties that only have linguistic access to one side of 
the communication.135 
 Additionally, since the court interpreter has a monopoly on communication between 
the court and the accused, any complaint as to the inadequacy of the interpreter must, by 
necessity, flow through the interpreter herself. Given that many or most interpreters are 
untrained and inexperienced, it places a great deal of faith in the integrity of such individuals 
to assume that they will automatically pass on a complaint about their own incompetence. 
This is especially true when one considers that some of the interpreters implicitly or explicitly 
approved by the ECtHR have been a family member,136 a fellow prisoner,137 and a customs 
official,138 each of whom likely had their own interests and motivations, and none of whom 
were legally required by the ECtHR to be independent or impartial.139 Furthermore, not every 
accused will be willing to make a contemporaneous complaint against their interpreter, who 
is probably the only person in the courtroom with whom they can converse. Regardless of 
their logic when applied to other substantive fair trial rights, enforcing a waiver doctrine in 
these circumstances to increase the efficiency of the court represents a needless weakening of 
the right to an interpreter. 
 Requiring the accused to prove after the fact that inadequate interpretation led to his 
conviction is likewise an illogical, and in some situations even impossible, task. It is no 
coincidence that in nearly every case where the ECtHR has found a violation of the right to 
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an interpreter, the violation arose because no interpreter was actually present.140 Under such 
circumstances, it is easy to show that the interpretation was inadequate because it never 
existed. On the other hand, proving the inadequacy of an interpretation that occurred is 
virtually impossible for the simple reason that the only record of the proceedings will be 
monolingual.141 In other words, there will be no record of the foreign language, only the 
language of the court, and very few interpreter errors are so blatant as to be immediately 
noticeable in a monolingual record.142 Unable to look at a foreign language record of the trial 
and identify every possible error of interpretation, the accused has no chance to show the 
consequences of these mistakes on his eventual conviction and therefore no evidence with 
which to meet the harm standard imposed by the courts. Attempting to assess the adequacy of 
an interpreter’s work with only a one-sided record of the interpretation is akin to judging the 
accuracy of a reproduction painting without ever having seen the original. It is, to be blunt, 
impossible. 
 The provision of a bilingual record documenting both sides of the interpretation 
would remove this hindrance by allowing for objective evaluation of the interpreter’s work 
after the fact. However the provision of such records is rare, and for defensible reasons. At 
the outset, the practical difficulties in creating a bilingual record are substantial.143 Either a 
second court reporter must be engaged or extensive audio recording equipment must be 
acquired and overseen by trained technicians.144 Both of these options create added costs and 
the potential for increased courtroom disruptions and delays. Moreover, there has been a very 
real concern expressed by scholars that the provision of a foreign language record would 
open a Pandora’s box of increased appellate complaints with respect to interpreter 
competence.145 Leaving these apprehensions aside, the provision of a bilingual record in 
interpreter cases may well be a necessary part of the right to appeal. In Lumley v. Jamaica, 
the UNHRC held that an applicant was entitled to a trial transcript because without such a 
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document he would lack the evidentiary material necessary to prosecute his appeal.146 Where 
an accused in an interpreted case seeks to challenge the quality of the interpretation he was 
afforded, a bilingual record would serve the same purpose as a trial transcript in a 
monolingual proceeding. Thus, failure to provide bilingual records in such cases, especially if 
only due to cost concerns and fears of increased disruption, would not only be bad policy that 
undermines the right to an interpreter, but also likely a violation of the right to an appeal. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Where one of the courtroom participants does not understand or speak the language of the 
court, the appointment of a competent court interpreter is in the best interests of everyone 
involved. As Trechsel notes, it is an ‘essential prerequisite for the proper functioning of the 
administration of justice.’147 Yet the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HRC with respect to 
the right to an interpreter has placed such a heavy implicit emphasis on the reduction of costs, 
disruptions and delays, that the right itself has been left virtually ineffective.  
 There is no defined standard for who should be given an interpreter, and the 
amorphous standard (‘sufficiently proficient’) that does exist is implemented by a judge who 
has no training in how to accurately assess the language capability of an accused. There are 
no limitations for who may be appointed as an interpreter, which has led to an epidemic of 
untrained and inexperienced individuals being employed who are almost guaranteed to be 
incapable of performing the task adequately. By seemingly defining ‘adequacy’ to include 
summary interpretation, there is apparently no real interest in guaranteeing that the 
interpretation given by these individuals is actually ‘adequate’ for the accused to understand 
and participate in the proceedings. Moreover, it is left up to the accused, the most vulnerable 
person in the courtroom and, by definition, the only one person who does not understand 
what is happening, to complain about any inadequacy, or risk losing the chance to enforce his 
right later on appeal. And even if the accused does complain and preserve his ability to 
appeal the issue, he has no way to prove that inadequacy after the fact, or that the 
interpreter’s mistakes led to his conviction (as he must), because he will not be given a 
bilingual record with which to prove it.  
 Taken together, the right to an interpreter, as developed by the ECtHR and the HRC, 
is itself a portrait of inadequacy. A fundamental misunderstanding of not only what 
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interpreters do, but also of their importance to the administration of justice, has led courts to 
undervalue the right and its protections. Courts ‘focus…on accommodating the immediate 
pragmatic needs’ of the normal courtroom participants as opposed to protecting the rights of 
those lacking linguistic competence.148 Time and again, the interests of cost reduction and 
judicial efficiency have been prioritized ahead of guaranteeing an effective right to an 
interpreter. These various trade offs have left a weakened and inadequate right that is 
incapable of fulfilling the dual purposes for which it was instituted; reinforcing the right to a 
defence, and eliminating any disadvantages that a language-incompetent accused would 
suffer vis-à-vis a similarly situated native accused. 
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